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NOTES
BAR INTEGRATION BY SUPREME COURT RULE
Bar integration has in a comparatively short period of years
become a problem of paramount importance to the legal profession.
It is an attempt to remedy the failure of sporadic efforts by the courts
and voluntary associations to maintain the high standards of the profession. The movement was based on recognition that the bar no
longer enjoyed the high degree of public confidence and respect it had
once merited. The argument for concerted action is primarily founded
on the belief that a few unethical members have degraded the good
name of the entire bar.' Proponents of bar integration feel that a
unified cooperating bench and bar could purge the profession of its
unworthy members, revive the ideal of public service, suppress the
unauthorized practice of law, provide necessary funds for research
and study by committees, and in general promote the proper adminis2

tration of justice.

Today Puerto Rico and 23 states have integrated bars. It is felt
in these states that the chief objectives have been gained. In 14 other
states, among them Wisconsin, there has been a strong movement for
integration.3
Three principal methods of bar integration have been followed:
1) by legislative act, as was done in 1923 in Alabama and Idaho, the
first states to achieve successful union; 2) by legislative incorporation, the plan followed in California 4 ; and 3) by orders promulgated
by the supreme court of the state, acting on petitions of individuals
and voluntary associations. The brief history of the movement shows
a growing tendency to shun detailed statutory control, coupled with
an increasing assertion by the courts of their power to regulate the
practice of law independently of any legislative permission. South
Dakota, in 1931, was the first state to have an organization in part
dependent upon bylaws requiring supreme court approval.
In 1934, the Kentucky bar was organized by supreme court rules
following a brief legislative enactment purporting to authorize it to
do so. A similar procedure is now being followed in Wyoming and
Texas. It was also in 1934 that Missouri integration was accomplished,
the first instance where a court acted on the petition of a bar associa' Clark, Disciplinary Problems of an Integrated Bar (1936)
Rv. 11.
2 Hugus, An Integrated Bar (1937) 43 W. VA. L. Q. 10.
3 23J. of Am. Jud. Soc. 161 (1939).
4 Cal. Stat. (1927) p. 38.
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tion.5 The Nebraska bar was unified, in 1937, by means of rules promulgated by the Supreme Court of that state. 6
The Oklahoma Supreme Court has recently taken the same action.
In re Integration of the State Bar of Oklahoma1 was a swift response
to the action of the legislature which repealed the act8 authorizing such
an organization. One of the pioneers in the battle for statewide integration, Oklahoma had passed an act authorizing it as early as 1929.9
After ten years of violent attack its opponents succeeded in having
the act repealed. On the following day the attorneys of the state began
to search for another route to their goal. After hearing the report of
a committee of lawyers, favoring integration in the public interest and
for the advancement of justice, the Supreme Court ordered such integration.
In doing so the court discussed the position of attorneys as officers
of the court and advisers to the public. Because of this position and
the importance of the relationships involved the court felt that it had
the right to protect itself and the public from the acts of its officers.
The Oklahoma Constitution did not expressly grant the power to
define and regulate the practice of law to any of the three departments of government, the court said, but it is an inherent power of the
judiciary and includes the right "to promulgate rules to create, control and regulate the bar of the state."'10
In this action we see a crystallization of an inchoate conflict during
the preceding years between the legislature and the judiciary of the
various jurisdictions as to the proper repository of the power to organize members of the profession. The Nebraska Supreme Court, in
acting favorably on the petition of a committee of attorneys appointed
by the State Bar Association, had upheld the inherent power of the
judicial department in this respect. That branch was the one to which
the power naturally belonged, the court said, although it should be
exercised only in its sound discretion."
Many other jurisdictions have denied the right of the legislature
to control and regulate the legal profession beyond a certain point.
Massachusetts had ruled that no statute can control the judiciary in
its right to admit and its power to remove, although such rights can be
2
recognized by legislative enactment. In Re Opinion of the Justices
5 23
6

J. of Am. Jud. Soc. 161 (1939).
In re Integration of the Nebraska State Bar Ass'n., 133 Neb. 283, 275 N.W.

265, 267, 114 A.L.R. 151 (1937).

7 (Okla. 1939 95 P. (2d) 113
85 Okla. Stat. Ann. 712 ff. (1939).

9Ibid.

10 In re Integration of State Bar of Oklahoma (Okla. 1939) 95 P. (2d) 113.
I ln re Integration of the Nebraska Bar Ass'n., 133 Neb. 283, 275 N.W. 265,

114 A.L.R. 151 (1937).
12279

Mass.607, 180 N.E.725, 727, 81 A.L.R. 1059 (1932).
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it was held that restrictions on entry into the practice of law found
in the statutes are to be regarded as limitations on individuals but not
on the judicial power itself.
A Kentucky disbarment proceeding, In re Sparks,1 3 gave the court
of that state the opportunity to reiterate its position that statutes purporting to give the court power to investigate and punish acts of offenders added nothing to authority already possessed by it, without the
need for legislative action. From the time of Justice Taney no court
has denied this doctrine. 14 In Kansas, Iowa, Montana and New Jersey
the courts have taken it as a matter of course.
In the last named states the supreme courts have implicitly stated
that it was necessary to show an increased voluntary membership in
the state bars as they then existed before the courts would care to
attempt integration by judicial order. 15
The future of unification by court order alone is one of special
interest in Wisconsin because of the failure of repeated efforts to
achieve legislative sanction. On one occasion a bill which had been
passed by the legislature was vetoed by the lieutenant-governor. At the
last session, in July of 1939, an integration bill passed the house, then
failed by a few votes in the Senate. In view of these experiences
perhaps the road to integration in this state is the one used in Oklahoma and Nebraska. However, if other states are to follow their lead
it seems that the nature of the act must first be determined. It has
been a long-standing precept in our jurisprudence that under a constitution such as ours the creation of a corporation is exclusively a legis16
lative function and one which cannot be delegated to the courts.
Is the integration of the bar an act of incorporation? Integration
in California was achieved by legislation making the state bar a public
corporation. 7 But does integration require the creation of a legal
entity? If it does, there would seem to be some doubt as to the right
of a court to achieve this result, even granted that the courts have
inherent power to control the bar. It may be that the solution in
Wisconsin lies in a constitutional amendment which will dispel any
doubt as to the power of the Supreme Court to act.
ROBERT D. JONES.
'13267 Ky. 93, 101 S.W. (2d) 194 (1936); Commonwealth ex rel Ward v. Harrington, 266 Ky. 41, 98 S.W. (2d) 53 (1936).
14Ex parte Secombe, 19 Harv. 9, 13, 15 L.Ed. 567 (1936).
is 23 J. of Am. Jud. Soc. 161 (1939).
16 Martinez v. De Ponce La Asociacion De Senoras Damas Del Santo Asilo,
213 U.S. 20, 129 Sup. Ct. 327, 53 L.Ed. *79 (1909) ; State ex rel. Shumway
v. Bennett, 29 Mich. 451, 18 Am. Rep. 107 (1874); Territory ex rel. Kelly v.
Stewart, 1 Wash. 98, 23 Pac. 405, 8 L.R.A. 106 (1890).
27 Cal. Stat. (1927) p. 38.

